906 Sheet – American State Trials 1918 Volume X Leo Frank Document

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Here is the translated text as follows:

866 X. AMERICAN STATE TRIALS

Your Honor, the arguments I shall present are directed to the court, not intended for the jury or the numerous audience present. This decision holds significant importance; much of the public happiness, peace, and liberty depend on the final verdict pronounced on this matter. Initially, I had doubts, but a calm and dispassionate inquiry, along with the most temperate investigation and reflection, has led me to believe and assert that the jury has the right to determine every question necessary before a sentence can be pronounced upon the defendant.

I contend that the jury has the right to decide whether the writing charged in the indictment as false, scandalous, and malicious is indeed a libel. If the court decides this question in the affirmative, I will endeavor to convince the jury that it is not a libel because there is no law in force under the government of the United States that defines what a libel is or prescribes its punishment. It is a universal principle of law that questions of law belong to the court, while the decision of facts belongs to the jury; however, a jury has the right to determine both law and fact in all cases.

Judge Chase asked Mr. Hay whether he intended to extend his proposition to civil as well as criminal cases, informing him that if he did, the law was clearly otherwise.

Mr. Hay stated that he believed the proposition to be universally true, but it was only necessary for him to prove it true in cases of a criminal nature.

Judge Chase again interrupted Mr. Hay and briefly expressed his opinion of the law. Mr. Hay folded up and put away his papers, seemingly declining any further argument.

Judge Chase requested him to continue his argument, adding, "Please proceed, and be assured that you will not be interrupted by me, say what you will."

Mr. Hay refused to proceed.

Judge Chase observed that although he felt it his duty to stop counsel when they were mistaken about the law, he did not intend to prevent further discussion.

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